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iN THE
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
AT RICHMOND.
.... ~- ,, . .
MINNIE G. WHITEHEAD IN HER OWN RIGHT AND
AS EXECUTRIX OF THE WILL OF 1' D.
WHITEHEAD, DECEASED,
versus
D. J. WHITEHEAD, ET ALS.
PETITION FOR APPEAL AND SUPERSEDEAS.
To the flovorable, the Chief Justice a,)d the Associate Jus-
tices of the Suprevie Co~trt of Appeals of Virqivia:
Your petitioner, Minnie G. Whitehead, in her own right
and as Executrix of the will of the late R. D. Whitehead,
shows unto your Honors that she is aggrieved by a final or-
der and decree entered by the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania
County in vacation on the 20th day of December, 1.938 (R.,
p. 40), which final order and decree undertook to constftie
the will of the late R. D. Whitehad, probated before the Olerk
of the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia; in' an
-ex parte proceeding on the 24th day of August, 1938 (R., p.
29), so as to vest in your petitioner in her own right a life
interest only in the property real and personal of the late
R. D. Whitehead instead of a fee simple therein and your
petitioner respectfully prays that she may be Miwarded an
appeal and snpersedeas to the said final order and decree.
A transcript of the order and decree and the proceedings
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in the trial Court is herewith presented. References are to
the pages of the manuscript record.
THE CASE.
R. D. Whitehead was a business man who had resided in
Chatham, Virginia, practically all of his life (R., p. 39).
2* He died in the Memorial Hospital at Danville *on the
31st day of July, 1938 (R., p. 21), behg then sixty-three
years and two months old (R., p. 39), survived by your peti-
tioner who is his widow (R., p. 39). No children were born
of his marriage (R., p. 39). On August 24, 1938, t.he last will
and testament of said R. D. Whitehead was duly probated be-
fore the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County,
Virginia, in an ex parte proceeding (R., p. 29). The will was
wholly in the handwriting of the said R. D. Whitehead (R.,
p. 29) and is in the following words and figures, to-wit:
"Since the Death of my Two Day's after the Burial
Brother J. J. Whitehead I of Cousin J. Hunt Hargrave
think I shall write a Will like
I want it.
R. D. Whitehead
At Home Glenview Farm Chatham Va. April 6th 1935
I, R. D. Whitehead being of Sound Mind and Disposing
Memory do make this My last Will and Testament bearby re-
voking all previous Wills Made by Me. First of all all of
my Just and Honest Debts be paid if there be any by my
Wife Minnie G. WhiteLead The Balance of my Estate I aive
to Mv Wife Minnie G. Whitehead Both real and Personal
also Cash, Bond Stocks and Insurance in fee Simple I hearby
Nominate and Appoint -Mv Said Wife Minnie G. Whitehead
as Administratrix of this My last Will and request the Court
not to require any Security or Appraisement of her as Such
I request Minnie G. Whitehead My Wife to give Mv Sister
Nannie D. Whitehead 150.00 a year as long as She lives and
has the Money to 2'ive ber. Upon the Death or Reniarriaoe of
My Wife Minnie G. Whitehead I want the balance of Iv
Estate to be Euallv divided between Mv Brothers Joseph
Whitehead-J. Hurt Whitehead-Walter M. Whitehead and
31y Sisters Nannie D. Whitehead-Sallie B. Millner-Ethel
M. Crider-Katie G. Watson-I also want my Niece Virginia
Rorer and My Nephew Douglas J. Whitehead to Share and
Share alike Mv Brothers & Sisters I also Want Mv Nelnhew
Richard H. Whitehead and Katie D. Whiteheal My Niece
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Jointly to have as much together as any one of the above
Mentioned In event any of the Brothers-Sisters Nephews
or Nieces are dead at the time of this distribution I direct
that the Shave of the deceased ones by Equally divided be-
tween the ones that are liveing
In Witness Whereof I have hereunto Set my hand and seal
this the 6th day of April 1935 at 1020 Oclock P. M. at Home.
R. D. WHITEHEAD" (R., p. 28).
An appraisal of the estate showed that the said R. D. White-
head was the owner at the time of his death of property of
an approximate value of $63,211.00 (R., p. 33).
Your petitioner qualified as Executrix of said will on the
24th day of August, 1938 (R., p. 29), and on the 1.8th day of
October, 1938, both in her own right and as Executrix of
said will, she filed her bill in the Circuit Court of Pittsyl-
3' vania '( County, Virginia, praying for a construction of
the said will. J. Hurt Whitehead, Walter -M. Whitehead,
Nannie D. Whitehead, Sallie B. Millner, Ethel D. Crider, Katie
G. Watson, Virginia Rorer Treadway (who is the same per-
son as Virginia Rorer), Douglas J. Whitehead, Richard H.
Whitehead and Katie D. Whitehead were made parties de-
fendant (R., p. 21). Thus all of the persons named in the
will became parties to the suit except Joseph Whitehead, a
brother of R. D. Whitehead who had predeceased the testator
(R., p. 23).
Your petitioner in said bill charged that the true intent
and meaning of the will of said R. D. Whitehead was to give
and vest your petitioner with a fee simple title and estate in
and to all of the estate both real and personal whereof the
said R. D. Whitehead died seised and possesed (R., p. 25).
She further charged that all of the parties defendant had
asserted some right or interest in the estate of said R. D.
Whitehead and that such claims constituted a cloud on her
title to both real estate and personal property belonging" to
her as sole devisee under the will of said R. D. WAhitehead
and that she had the right to the aid of the Court in a con-
struction of said will so as to remove said cloud and an ad-
judication establishing her right to a fee simle and absolute
title to said property free from'the claims of all persons
whomsoever and especially the parties defendant and a de-
cree to effectuate her claim was prayed for. Process was
served personally on the defendants, IT. Hurt Whitehead, Wal-
ter M. Whitehead, Sallie B. Millner, Katie G. Watson, Virginia
Rorer Treadway, )ouglas J. Whitehead and Katie D. White-
head (R., p. 39). There was an order of publication as to
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Nannie D. Whitehead, Ethel D. Crider and Richard H. White-
head. No answers were filed by any of the defendants except
D. J. Whitehead and Richard H. Whitehead. We assume that
as to all except these two, the bill must be taken for confessed.
Certainly this would seem to be true as to those on whom
process was personally served.
On November 23, 1938, separate answers were tendered and
filed on behalf of D. 3. Whitehead (R., p. 34) and Richard
H. Whitehead (R., p. 36). Neither of said answers contro-
vert any of the facts set out in the bill, but on the contrary.
specifically admit the truth of all such allegations. Bot]i
4 answers deny that the construction *of the will contended
for by your petitioner is the correct one and by inference
at least seem to assert that under a proper construction
of the will your petitioner takes only a life estate in the whole
of the personal and real property of the decedent, R. D.
Whitehead, with the remainder to the parties defendant in
the aforementioned suit. There was an agreed stipulation of
facts not set out in the pleadings (R., p. 39) and on December
3, 1938, the cause was by proper decree submitted for decision
and decree in vacation (R., p. 38).
On December 20, 1938, the final order and decree here com-
plained of was entered (R., p. 40). It is not necessary to
here set out the entire decree. It is sufficient for our pur-
poses to point out that it was adjudged, ordered and decreed
that
"1. That Minnie G. Whitehead, wife of R. D. Whitehead,
shall have, and take a life estate in all of the property and
estate whereof R. D. Whitehead died seised and possessed,
both real and personal, to enjoy the income therof rom during
the remainder of her life or until she should remarry, and out
of the income therefrom the said Minnie G. Whitehead shall
pay annually to Nannic D. Whitehead, sister of P. D. White-
head, the sum of one hundred and fifty ($150.00) dollars,
the said Minnie G. Whitehead to be without any power what-
soever to expend or dispose of any of the principal of the
said estate of R. D. Whitehead;
"2. That upon the death of remarirage of the said Min-
nie G. Whitehead, whichever event may first occur, the prin-
cipal of the estate of the R. D. Whitehead, both real and per-
sonal shall be distributed in equal shares to J. Hurt White-
head, Walter M. Whitehead, Nannie D. Whitehead, Sallie B.
Miliner, Ethel M. Crider, Katie G. Watson, Virginia Rorer
Tredway (one and the same person as Virginia Rorer), and
Douglas J. Whitehead, and one equal share to be distributed
jointly to Richard H. Whitehead and Katie D. Whitehead,
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that is to say Richard II. Whitehead and Katie D. Whitehead
shall together receive one share equally divided between
then;''
Thus it will be seen that the learned Chancellor adopted
the construction of the will contended for in the answers of
Douglas J. Whitehead and Richard H. Whitehead and in addi-
tion thereto construed the language "I request Minnie G.
Whitehead My Wife to give My Sister Nannie 1). Whitehead
$150.00 a year as long as She lives and has the Money to
give her" as creating a charge upon the life estate of Minnie
Gi. Whitehead of an annual payment of $150.00 for the benefit
of the said Nannie D. Whitehead. Of course, neither in
;5' the bill nor 'either answer filed is there any request for a
construction of this particular language.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.
(1) The Court erred in refusing to decree that your peti-
tioner, -Minnie G. Whitehead, in her own right was vested
with a fee simple and absolute title to all of the property
both real and personal of which R. D. Whitehead died seised
and possessed.
(2) The Court erred in decreeing that upon the death or
remarriage of your petitioner, whfichever event -may first oc-
cur, the principal of the estate of said R. D. Whitehead b'oth
real and personal shall be distributed among the parties de-
fendant mentioned in the suit referred to.
(3) The Court erred in decreeing that your petitioner shall
pay annually to Nannie D. Whitehead the sum of one hun-
dred fifty ($150.00) dollars out of the income derived from
the estate of the late R. D. Whitehead and in constituting said
annual payment as a charge upon said income.
ARGUMENT.
Assignments of Error #1 and #2-These two assign-
ments will be discussed together as a decision of them both
clearly involve the proper construction of the will of R. D.
Whitehead. Before any discussion of the law or the citation
of any authority, it may be profitable to briefly consider the
will itself. It first provides for the payment of the testator's
lust debts. Then immediately following this language, "The
Balance of my Estate I give to my Wife Minnie G. White-
head Both real and Personal also Cash, Bond Stocks and In-
surance in fee Simple. I hearby Nominate and Appoint My
Said Wife Minnie G. Whitehead as Administratrix of this My
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last Will and request the Court not to require any Security
or Appraisement of her as Such". It is difficult to conceive
of any words which could have been used that would have
more strongly indicated a purpose to bequeath and de-
6* vise to the wife an absolute and fee simple title 'in and
to all of the property of the testator except such as might
be required to pay his debts. He "gave'" to his wife "in fee
simple" the balance of his estate "real and personal" after
payment of his debts. He named her as his "adminitratrix'"
and requested that there be no "appraisement" of his estate
and that she should riot be required to give "security" a,-
"such" administratrix. The use of the words "give" and
"fee simple" are strongly indicative of the extent of the
title that he intended to vest in your petitioner. The fact that
he named your petitioner as "administratrix" of his will and
estate and thereby authorized her to take over more than
thirty-five thousand (435,000.00) dollars in personal property
and requested that no security be required of her for the
protection of any third party adds weight to the conclusion
that he must have intended for your petitioner to take hig
property without any legal obligation or liability on her part
to any such third party.
Immediately after the foregoing provision for the wife.
there occurs the language "I request Minnie G. Whitehead
My Wife to give My Sister Nannie D. Whitehead $150.00 a
year as long as She lives and has the Money to give her".
To us it seems.clear ihat this language is meant to be what
on its face it says it is, to-wit, a mere "request" made by
the testator of the wife upon whom he had bestowed his en-
tire estate. That request is that the wife shall give the sis-
ter one hundred fifty ($150.00) dollars per year a long as
the wife lives "and has the money to give her". The use
of the word "request" we insist indicates a purpose to im-
pose upon your petitioner a moral obligation at most to com-
ply with the wishes of her husband and falls far short of
creating any legal charge upon the estate of the tesfafor either
income or principal. Moreover, the fact that the testator
contemplated that the time might come when his wife, your
petitioner, might not "have the money to give her" (the sis-
ter) seems to us to add force to our contention that the tes-
tator intended to give his entire estate in fee simple to his
wife. If as decreed by the trial Chancellor, your petitioner
7* takes only a life estate in the property left 'by R. D.
Whitehead and if as so decreed your petitioner is "with-
out any power whatsoever to expend or dispose of any of
the principal of the said estate of R. D. Whitehead", it is
almost inconceivable that there should ever come a time when
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real estate of a value of twenty-eight thousand one hundred
fifty ($28,150.00) dollars and personalty of a value of thirty-
five thousand sixty-one ($35,061.00) dollars would fail to
yield a net income of at least one hundred fifty ($150.00)
dollars per year which is between two-tenths (2/10) and
three-tenths (3/10) of one per cent (1%/c) of the principal
estate. lndeed if the testator intended that this payment to
the sister should constitute a charge on the estate both prin-
cipal and income and it could be anticipated that there would
be no income whatsoever, the personalty alone would be suf-
ficient to pay the charge for more than two hundred years
and the entire estate sufficient for that purpose for more
than four hundred rears. Of course we understand that the
trial Chancellor did not go so far as to hold that the annual
payment to the sister should constitute a charge against the
principal of the estate but did hold that such payment con-
stituted a charge on the income only. However, as we see
it, if the testator intended that this payment should consti-
tute a charge against any part of his property he must have
intended it to be a char'e against it all. The request to the
wife is not pay the same out of income but to pay it so long
as the wife has the money so to do. We are therefore forced
to the conclusion that having left all of his property to his
wife in fee simple, he was conscious of the fact that, the wife
might spend or lose it all and therefore be limited the request
to such time as the wife might have the money to give, lie
would hardly have anticipated such a possibility if he had
intended for his estate to be held intact until tie death or
remarriage of his wife, with power in said wife to spend the
income only during that period.
After the request made on behalf of the sister, the will
continues as follows: "Upon the Death or Remarriage of
My Wife Minnie G. Whitehead I want the balance of Mv Es-
tate to be Equally divided between My Brothers Joseph
81", 'Whitehead-J. Hurt Whitehead-Walter M. Whitehead,
etc." It is apparent to us that in this provision the
testator was merely expressing a wish that he did not intend
to be legally binding upon your petitioner. He had in mind
his affection for his surviving brothers and sisters and cer-
tain of his nieces and nephews. He wanted his widow to
kuow that should she remarry or in the event of her death,
he would prefer that such of hiis property as remained should
be divided among these of his kin whom he named. If he
had had any other purpose, then the testator would have un-
questionably used language that would have put that purpose
beyond controversy. He knew the meaning" of "give" be-
cause he had already used the same in the will. He knew the
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meaning of "request" He knew the meaning of "want".
It isinconceivable that he used-the three expressions inter-
changeably.. ..
We have discussed separately the three phases of the will
that are in controversy as follows: (a) the gift in fee simple
to the wife, (b) the request on behalf of the sister and (c)
the wish expressed on behalf of the brothers and sisters and
certain nieces and nephews. Treating these provisions sepa-
rately and apart from each other, we think that we are justi-
fied in construing the will as we have heretofore indicated.
When the will is read as a whole, it seems to us that this con-
struction is strengthened. In no other way can the three
provisions be harmonized. To hold that the testator intended
to bestow on your petitioner a mere life estate is to ignore
the fact that he "gave" her his estate in "fee simple". To
hold that the "request" with respect to the sister created a
charge upon the testator's estate is entirely inconsistent with
the provision made foi the wife. To hold that the language
expressing his wishes or wants with respect to his brothers
and sisters and some of his nieces and nephews vested in
them an interest in the nature of a remainder is in the teeth
of a manifest purpose to "give" to the wife a "fee sim-
ple" title to all of his property after the payment of debts.
On the other hand to construe the will according to its lan-
guage and bold that it "gives" to the wife a "fee simple"
title to such property as the will says; that the "request"
9* that certain *provision be made for the sister is a "re-
quest" as the will says; and that the wish for a distribu-
tion of his property upon the death or remarriage of his
widow is in fact a wish or the expression of a "want" upon
the part of the testator as the will says is to eliminate in-
consistencies and to harmonize the whole. This seems to us
to be the practical, common sense construction that should
appeal to the average, every day, common sense layman who
has never looked into a law book.
Turning
' to the authorities, we find the intent of the testa-
tor is the cardinal rule in the c-onstruction of wills. We quote
from 1 Harrison on Wills and Administration, 266z368, as
follow s: .... . .
"Testator's Intention Cardinal Rule of Construction.
"Every case reiterates the principle of the controlling
force of the testator's intents. As Chief Justice Marshall
said: 'The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the
construction of wills, and, if that intent can be clearly con-
ceived and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it
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nmust prevail.' And as said in many cases: 'Intention is the
life and soul of a will and the great point to be ascertained.'
Judge Carr in Land v. Otleg, 4 Rand. 213, puts it this way:
'In the construction of wills the first inquiry is into the
meaning of the testator. This is the animating spirit, the
essence, the soul of the will. The words are the clothing, the
mere vehicle used, to convey his ideas. When we once ascer-
tain the intention of the testator, that is the governing prin-
ciple and must prevail unless it violates some rule of law.
It would be a waste of time to quote cases to prove this.
There is nothing technical about a will; no set forg o.f words
necessary. They are very often written by persons who,
wholly ignorant of form, use their own homely and crude
style to express their ideas, and if the language, however un-
couth, be intelligible, and the meaning, when gathered, be
lawful, it must be carried into effect.'. Other cases describe
the intent as the 'polar star' for the guidance of the judicial
expositor."
"Intention Must Be Expressed in Will.
"The intention must be collected from the words of the
will, for the object of construction is not to ascertain the pre-
sumed or supposed but the expressed intention.of the. testa-
for; that is, the meaning which the words of the .will, cor-
rectly interpreted, convey. It is not proper for the court
to venture into speculations as to what the testator may have
intended. Conjecture cannot be permitted to usurp. the place
oV judicial construction, nor supply what the testator has
failed sufficiently to indicate. The true inquiry is not what
the testator meant to express, but what the words he used
do express. As said by Judge English, in Pack v. Shanklin,
43 W. Va. 304, 27 S. E. 389, 'The 'cardinal rile con-
10' trolling the interpretation of wills is that the intention
of the testator must be looked for, and in order to as-
certain the meaning of the testator, we must take the will by
the four corners and look upon its face and there find the in-
tent from the words used. As was announced in the- case-of
Couch v. Easthamn, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S. E. 23, 'in the interpre-
tation of wills the true inquiry is not what the te.4t or meant
to express, but what do the words used express'."
That this distin'uished Virginia authority has correctly
stated this cardinal rule cannot be questioned. That the Vir-
ginia rule is in accord with the general law on the subject is
equally as obvious.
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28 R. C. L. 211 et seq.
69 C. J. 52 et seq.
2 Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrations 967
et seq.
1 Page on Wills 1366-1377.
In 1 Harrison on Wills anid Administration, 379, it is said:
"Nothing is better settled than that in the construction of
the will, all parts of it must be examined and the intention
of the testator ascertained, not from one clause only, but from
the entire instrument. Al isolated clause faken from its
context may present ai entirely different meaniing than when
read as a part of the entire instrument. Besides, wills may
be of great obscurity and the entire instrument can alone show
the true intenut of the testator. It is, therefore, laid down in
a number of eases that 'the rule which controls all others in
the interpretation of wills is that the intention of the testa-
tor must be gathered from the entire will'."
In I Harrison on Wills and Administration, 382, it is said:
"It is well settled that clear and unambiguous provisions
expressly made cannot be controlled by mere inference from
general or ambiguous provisions in other parts of the will.
Thus, it is stated in many cases, 'It is a settled rule of con-
struction, both in deeds and wills, that if an estate is conveyed
or an interest given, or a benefit bestowed in one part of the
instrument by clear, unambiguous and explicit words, such
estate, interest or benefit is not diminished or destroyed by
words in another part of the instrument unless the terms
which diminish or destroy the estate before given be as clear
and decisive as the terms by which it was created'."
In 1 Harrison on Wills and Administration, 384, it is said:
"In this connection, it must be noted that while conflict-
ing clauses will be reconciled, if possible, and if impossible,
that the last devise will control, yet, there are certain limi-
tations which are repngnant to the estate created and that,
therefore, will be rejected as a void attempt on the part of
the testator to create an estate unknown to the law. Thus,
a testator cannot create an estate in fee and atfach to it con-
ditions and limitations inconsistent with the fe.tc. A testator
cannot give an estate in fee and then write a will for the donee
of the estate or prescribe the extent and liability of his en-
joyment of it."
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11 'Again, the same author says:
"Where words are the ordinary words, they will be given
their ordinary meaning unless it leads to a manife-t defeat
of the intention of the testator. ' "" ' It is not necessary, there-
fore, to use technical words to create any kind of an estate
by a will. But while this is true, yet where technical words
are used in a will, the presumption is that they are used in
their correct technical sense." 1 Harrison on Wills and Ad-
ministration, 391.
The foregoing statements are so elementary that we deem
it unnecessary to cite any additional authority to support
them.
In our view the construction found by the trial Chancellor
is in the teeth of a long line of Virginia cases. We name some
of them as follows:
Burwell's Exrs. v. Anderson's Admr., 3 Leigh 376.
May v. Joynies, 20 Gratt. 692.
Carr v. Effinger, 78 Va. 397.
Cole v. Cole, 79 Va. 251.
Hall v. Palmer, 87 Va. 354, 12 S. E. 618, 11 L. RI. A. 610, 24
A. S. R. 653.
Bowen v. Bouen, 87 Va. 438, 12 S. E. 885, 24 A. S. R. 664.
Robertson v. Hardy. 2 Va. Dec. 275, 23 S. E. 766.
Farish v. IVayman, 91 Va. 430, 21 S. E. 810.
Warivq v. Waring, 96 Va. 641, 32 S. E. 150.
Browni's Guardian v. Strother's Admr., 102 Va. 145, 47 S.
E. 236.
Binq v. Burris, 106 Va. 478, 56 S. E. 222.
Hawley v. Vatkins. 109 Va. 122, 63 S. E. 560.
Rolley v. Rolley, 109 Va. 449, 63 S. E. 988, 21 L. R. A. N.
S. 64.
Hunter v. Hicks, 109 Va. 615, 64 S. E. 988.
Randall v. Harrison, 109 Va. 686, 64 S. E. 992.
Crutch field v. Greer, 113 Va. 232, 74 S. E. 166.
Ross v. Ross Exr., 115 Va. 374, 79 S. E. 343.
Smith v. Smith's Exrs., 122 Va. 341, 94 S. E. 777.
Conrad v. Conrad's Exrs., 123 Va. 711, 97 S. E. 336.
Steffeyq v. King, 126 Va. 120, 101 S. E. 62.
Barnett v. Blain, 126 Va. 179, 101 S. E. 239.
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A more complete list of the Virginia cases are found in the
footnote compiled by Judge Burks and listed at the bottom
of page 722 of volume 123 Virginia Reports in the discus-
sion of Conrad v. Co'nrad's Exr., supra.
Obviously it would extend this petition beyond all reason-
able limits if we attempted to analyse or discuss the facts
of the cases referred to. We shall do so in a few instances
only. Remembering that in providing for his wife, the tes-
tator used the word "give", we turn to Neblett v. Smith, 142
Va. 840, 128 S. E. 247, and there on page S54 of the of-
12' ficial report we find that *the word "give" is well
adapted to testamentary disposition, "for the ruling
purpose is to confer proper rights gratuitously". Remem-
bering also that this gift was "in fee simple", we find from
an examination of Smith, et al., v. Smith's Exrs., et als., 122
Va. 341, 94 S. E. 777, that a fee simple "is an estate of per-
petuity, and confers an unlimited power of alienation, and
no person is capable of having a greater estate or interest
in land. Every restraint upon alienation is inconsistent with
the nature of a fee simple". 122 Va. 352.
Moreover, we think it well established that "Generally or-
dinary words are to be given their usual and ordinary mean-
ings and technical words are presumed to have been used in
a technical sense". Conrad v. Conrad, supra, Ross v. Ross,
supra; IVarinq v. Waring, supra.
We direct the Court's attention to several cases from the
foregoing list wherein the language of the will there in ques-
tion was similar to that here involved.
Rolley v. Rolley (1909), 109 Va. 449, 64 S. E. 992, involved
the construction of a will which had these provisions:
"Secondly, I desire and direct that at the time of my de-
cease, all the property of every kind, real, personal and
mixed, of which I may at that time be seized and possessed,
shall pass into the possession of my beloved wife, Mary A.
Rollev, and so remain, to be used and enjoyed by her, in such
quantities as may be requisite for her comfortable mainte-
nance, so long as she shall remain my widow, and hence, to
that end and extent only, I do hereby give and bequeath the
samr to her, my said beloved wife Mary A. Rollev.
"Thirdly, And I furthermore desire and direct that, at such
time as my said beloved wife, Mary A. Rolley, shall cease
to be my widow, all of my property received by her here-
under, which shall then be unconsumed, shall then pass to
and become the property of my beloved daughter, Elizabeth
B. Rolley, for the term of her natural life, provided, however,
that she, my said beloved daughter shall not live to attain
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the age of twenty-one years, and hence, subject to the fore-
going provisions and to the extent aforesaid, I do give and
bequeath the said property to her, my said beloved daughter,
Elizabeth B. Polley.
"Fourthly, And I do furthermore desire and direct, that
if my said beloved wife, Mary A. Rolley, shall at any time
cease to remain my widow, thereby causing the property
hereinbefore disposed of to pass as aforesaid unto the said
Elizabeth B. Rolley, and the said Elizabeth B. Rolley shall
not live to attain the age of twenty-one years that, at the
death of the said Elizabeth B. Polley, all the property
13' so passing to her 'as aforesaid, shall then revert unto
the said Mary A. Polley, whether at such time she be
my widow or not, absolutely and in fee simple.
"Fifthly, And I do furthermore desire and direct, that if
the said property hereinbefore disposed of shall by any pro-
vision of this my last will and testament pass into the pos-
session of my said beloved daughter, Elizabeth B. Rolley,
and she, the said Elizabeth B. Rolley, shall live to attain the
age of twenty-one years, that upon her so arriving at age,
all of the said property shall then become hers, in fee simple
and absolutely, and hence, to the extent named in this and
the fourth section or paragraph of this my last will and
testament, and subject to the provisions therein contained, I
do give and bequeath all the said property."
It will be observed that here the testator did not "give'"
his property to his wife "in fee simple" as is the case in the
will now under consideration. He merely provided that it
should pass into her possession "to be used and enjoyed by
her, in such quantities as may he requisite for her comfort-
able maintenance, so long as she shall remain my widow, and
hence, to that end a.nd extent only" the property was given
and bequeathed to her. Provision was made as to the dis-
position of the property should the wife cease to remain the
widow of the testator. Nevertheless, this Court held that
the wife took a fee simple title to the entire estate. In the
opinion it is said:
"As is said in the petition for appeal, this is one of many
cases where the testator has sought to bestow upon the bene-
ficiary of his bounty an estate with the attributes of a fee
simple, or authority to consume it, and yet provide that if
the beneficiary shall fail to exercise such authority, the prop-
erty shall go over to another.
"In Farish v. Wayman, 91 Va. 430, 21 S. E. 810, after con-
sidering a number of authorities, Judge Harrison, speaking
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for this court, says: 'The cases cited clearly establish that
whenever it is the intention of the testator that the devisee
shall have an unrestrained power of disposition over the
property devised, whether such intention be expressed or
necessarily implied, a limitation over to another is void, be-
cause it is inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the estate
given to the first devisee, although the will shows that it was
the testator's intention, in respect to the property given to the
first taker, that 'what may remain of the same', or 'whatever
may remain at his death', or 'so much thereof as may he in
existence at his death', or 'such part as he may not appro-
priate', or 'what may be on hand at his death', should go
to another. Such intention must fail on account of its un-
certainty, and the first taker acquires the absolute property'.'
109 Va. 451.
1 47  '"'The testator bequeathed all of his property of every
kind to Mary A. Rolley, to be used and enjoyed by her
during her life or widovhood, in such quantities as night be
requisite for her comfortable maintenance. It is subjected to
her uncontrolled discretion, to be used and enjoyed for her
comfortable maintenance as she may see fit; and this Ian-
guage, under the authorities cited, clothes her with an un-
restrained power of disposition over the property devised."
109 Va. 452.
Smith, et als., v. Smith's Exr., ef a le. (1918), 12Z Va. 34I
94 S. E. 777, involved the construction of the following pro-
vision of the will of William C. Smith:
" 'Item First. I give and devise all my esfate, real and
personal, unto ry wife, Martha E. Smith, for and during her
natural life to be used and enjoyed by her as she shall think
proper, as fully as if the same were hers in fee simple, and
at her death, it is my will that my said estate shall pass t(v
and be equally divided amongst all my children then livingw
and the descendants of any deceased child, said descendants
taking said child's part-that is, the part said deceased child
would have been entitled to receive if living at that time. It
being my will that no interest or estate shall vest in any
child or the descendants of any, until the death of my wife." '"
It will be observed that the gift to the wife was "for and
during her natural life" but "to be used and enjoyed by her-
as she shall think proper, as fully as if the same were hers inT
fee simple". The testator clearly indicated how he wished
his property to be divided upon the death of the wife. In
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fact he did not merely express a wish or "want" in this
connection, but said that such a division "shall" be made.
Nevertheless, this Court held that the wife took a fee simple
because of the use of the words "to be used and enjoyed by
her as she shall think proper, as fully as if the same were hers
in fee simple". This Court says:
"If one has the right and power to use and enjoy property
as one thinks proper to the same extent as the law gives to
one owning a fee simple title, then the one who has such right
and power is the fee simple owner of that property." 1-22
Va. 352.
The opinion then defines a "fee simple" and adds:
"Now appropriately insert for the words 'fee simple' in
W. C. Smith's will the above definition and he would have,
'I give and devise all my estate, real and personal, to my wife.
Martha E. Smith, for and during her natural life to be used
and enjoyed by her as she shall think proper as fully as if
the same were hers in perpetuity and with unlimited power
of alienation, and at my death it is my will', etc." 122 Va.
352.
15* 'If the same course is pursued with the will of R. D.
Whitehead, then the provision for the wife would read
"The Balance of my Estate I give to My Wife Minnie G.
Whitehead Both real and Personal also Cash, Bond Stocks
and Insurance in perpetuity and with unlimited power of
alienation ".
Worn ow v. Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute
(1926), 144 Va. 533, 132 S. E. 344, had under consideration
these provisions of the will of Simon Bryant:
"Third. I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Catha-
rine Bryant, in token of my love for and absolute confidence
in her, absolutely and in fee simple, all property real, per-
sonal or mixed of which I may die seized of and possessed,
or to which I may be entitled at the time of mv death, to use
and dispose of as she may desire, upon condition, however,
that should she not so dispose of the same before her death,
then I give to Mary L. Bryant, my daughter, all of the per-
sonal property so remainino- undisposed of at the time of the
death of mv said wife, Catharine Bryant, absolutely to dis-
pose of or to use as she may desire; I also give to my said
daughter, Mary L. Bryant, in fee simple my lot on West Queen
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Street in the town of Hampton, which said lot is bounded
on the south fifty-three feet by Queen street and extends back
to Grant street together with all improvements, appurten-
ances and privileges thereunto belonging;
"Fourth. I give and bequeath to my niece, Sallie Wornom,
whose maiden name was Sallie Hillman, wife of Tom Wor-
nom, sometimes called Tom Vernon, in fee simple, to use
and dispose of as she may think proper, my house and lot
on the road leading from Gatewood's Corner to Zion Church,
near where the railroad crosses said road, which said lot
formerly was a part of the Normal School farm, also five lots
purchased by me from Ransone Brothers, near the Spiller
Academy, which are a part of what was originally a part of
the John L. Peek farm."
It was held that the widow took a fee simple in the lot men-
tioned in clause four notwithstanding the provision made in
that clause. We quote from the Court's opinion:
"(3, 4) The will must be read as a whole, and all of its
clauses reconciled, if it is fairly possible to do so, in view
of the language used. Reading them thus together, we find
in the third clause the indication that there was in the tes-
tator's mind the thought that although he had made an ab-
solute gift of all of his property, real and personal, to his
wife, she might not use or dispose of it all before her death.
With this idea in mind, he, in the same clause, then under-
took to give one of his lots, that on west Queen street, in
Hampton, to his daughter Mary L. Bryant. It needs no cita-
tion of authorities to support the view that this gift over to
his daughter of the property which he had already by the
same clause devised in fee simple t6 his wife, is *invalid
16* under the May v. Joynes (20 Gratt. (61 Va.), 692) case
and the unbroken line of other cases which enforce the
rule there stated.
"(5) We think there can be no doubt whatever that this
rule should also be applied in construing this fourth clause
of the will, under which the appellant, Wornom, here claims,
and that the testator had no idea of therebv revoking the
previous gift to his wife in favor of the appellant, but that
he attempted to give the property described o Sallie Wornom
only in the event that his wife failed to dispose of it. This
we feel sure is the true construction to be here applied. We,
therefore, conclude that as Catherine Bryant took a fee sim-
ple, the inconsistent gift over is void, because the testalor
tmdertook to do that which is legally impossible. The fact
that the gift over appears in the fourth clause has no spe-
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Qial significance, and is invalid because it is subject to the
fee simple and absolute power of disposition so clearly vested
in Clathe,'ine Bryant by the third clause of the will." 144 Va.
540-541.
Skinuer, et als., v. Skinner's Adnr., et als. (1932), 158 Va.
326, 163 S. E. 90, involved the construction of two clauses
of the will of J. R. Skinner as follows:
"Third: I bequeath my entire estate both real and per-
sonal to my beloved wife, Mary E. Skinner, and to my chil-
dren, namely: Maude Irene, Adelaide, Lizzie Effie, Rkobert
Emile, Katie Alferena, and Jessie Randolph, to share and
share alike, except as provided in clauses fourth, fifth and
sixth of this will and testament.
"Sixth: It is my intention that the equal share bequeathed
to my beloved wife, Mary E. Skinner, shall be in lieu of the
usual life right in one-third of the estate, and that upon her
death such remaining part of this bequest as she shall die
possessed of, if any, shall revert to my estate.."
Here a bequest to the wife made in clause three was by
reference made subject to provisions of clauses four, fir e and
six. In clause six it was specifically provided that the're-
maining part of the bequest at the time of her death should
revert to testator's estate. The question before the Court
was whether it did so revert or was the bequest one in fee
simple. This Court said:
"(1) Comsel for the complainants urge that the two clauses,
in question, of the will must be read together, and when this
is done it becomes apparent that the intention of the testator
was to make his wife, Mary E. Skinner, a life tenant of his
bounty to her. Let us see. It cannot be successfully con-
troverted, we think, that by clause three all of the devisees
and legatees mentioned, of whom Mary E. Skinner was one,
were 0-iven a fee simple estate in the shares of the prop-
17* ertv devised or bequeathed to them. They were ''riven
their parts outright by apt and effective phraseology.
There was no suggestion of a life estate. Then if this is true,
it was the intention of the testator so to do. It was his major
primary intention. The testator, however, undertakes to
qualify his bequest to his wife by the reference, 'except as
D'ovided in clauses fourth, fifth and sixth of this will and
testament'. In clause sixth he declares that it is his intention
that the equal share bequeathed to his wife shall be in lieu
of the usual life right in the estate, which would go to her,
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but if anything remained at her death it should revert fa
his estate. Here he undertakes to accomplish something that
the law does not allow. He has given his wife an estate in
fee simple because he has given her the absolute dominion
over it. She may do what she will with it." 158. Va- 331.
And, again:
"We think the will of J. R. Skinner invested his widow,
Mary E. Skimer, with a fee simple estate in that portion
of his estate given to her and that the attempted limitation
over of any portion remaining at her death, to revert to his
estate, was void for repugnancy and uncertainity." 159 Va.
334.
Ws call particular attention to this case because there is a
very interesting and illuminating discussion of prior Vir-
ginia cases in the opinion by Mir. Justice Browning.
Sowthworth v. Sullivan (1934), 162 Va. 325, 173 S. E. 524,
construed this language of the will of Benjamin F. Mar-
shall:
"I give and bequeath to my beloved wife Louisa Marshall
my entire estate both real and personal of every description
to have in fee simple to use as she may best see fit for her
maintenance while she may live even if it consumes all.
"Whatsoever may be left at her death I desire shall go
to my beloved niece and adopted daughter Verna E. South-
worth save any article of personal property as she may see
fit to bestow upon some friend that kindly considered her in
her last days."
It was held that upon the death of Louisa MarshafI then
Verna E. Southworth became and was entitled under the will
of Benjamin F. Marshall fo a fee simple estate in all the real
estate of which he died seized which had not beer disposed of
by Louisa Marshall. However, the holding is expressly based
upon the provisions of Chapter 146 Acts 1909, p. 407. Sinc
repealed by Section 5147 of the Code of 1919. We quote from
the opinion as follows:
18* *" (12) Under the decisions of this court the gift over
to Verna E. Southworth would not have been valid had
the testator died prior fo the date upon which fhe act of
1908 became effective, June 26, 1908. Nor would it have
been valid had the testator died after the repeal of the act
of 1908 by the enactment of the Code of 1919, and the sub-
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stitution therein of section 5147 in the place of the act of
1908. But it was rendered valid by the act of 1-908, which
was in effect when the testator died; and notwithstanding the
repeal of the act of 1908 and the fact that the gift over did
not vest in possession until after it had been repealed, it re-
mains valid and enforceable." 162 Va. 346.
The foregoing Virginia cases seem to us to be conclusively
favorable to the contention of your petitioner that under the
provisions of her husband's will, she takes a fee simple and
absolute title to all of his property both real and personal
after the payment of testator's just debts. The language of
the R. D. Whitehead will seems to us to be even stronger in
its implications to that effect than any of the wills in the cases
we have discussed.
We, therefore, insist that the decree of the Chancellor is
clearly wrong in that he construed the will of R. D. White-
head to vest in your petitioner a life estate only in and to
the property of testator R. D. Whitehead, the remainder to
certain of his brothers and sisters and nieces and nephews.
It is clear to us that the decree should have provided that a
fee simple and absolute title to testator's estate should vest
in your petitioner.
Assignment of Error #3. It is so clear to us that the
Chancellor erred in holding that the request for an annual
payment of one hundred fifty ($150.00) dollars to Nannie D.
Whitehead, sister of the testator, constituted a charge upon
testator's estate that we do not at this time care to submit any
argument or authorities on this branch of our case.
CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, your petitioner respectfully
prays that she may be awarded an appeal and supersedeas
to the order and decree aforesaid and that said order and
decree may be reversed and set aside and a final order
19* and *decree rendered in favor of your petitioner de-
creeing that she, your petitioner, shall take a fee simple
and absolute title in and to all of the estate both real and
personal of which the testator, R. D. Whitehead, died seised
and possessed free from any charge or claim whatsoever ex-
cept payment of the just debts of the said R. D. Whitehead.
Your petitioner avers that on February 9th, 1939, a copy
of this petition was delivered in person to N. E. Clement of
Chatham, Virginia, who was counsel for D. J. Whitehead in
the lower Court and -our petitioner further avers that on
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February 9th, 1939, a copy of this petition was delivered
in person to Mr. Grasty Crews of Danville, Virginia, a mem-
ber of the firm of Crews and Clement, which firm was counsel
for Richard H. Whitehead in the lower Court.
Your petitioner requests that her counsel may be permitted
to supplement this written petition by oral argument of the
reasons for reviewing the order and judgment complained
of.
Your petitioner further avers that the original of this pe-
tition is to be filed with Honorable George L. Browning, a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia with
the request that oral argument by counsel for the petitioner
be heard by him at such place as may suit his convenience and
at such time as may suit his convenience not earlier than Feb-
ruary 20, 1939.
Respectfully submitted,
MINNIE G. WHITEHEAD,
By Counsel.
E. C. HURT, JR.,
Chatham, Virginia,
JOSEPH WHITEHEAD, JR.,
Chatham, Virginia,
CARTER AND WILLIAMS,
Danville, Virginia,
By JNO. W. CARTER, JR.,
Counsel for Petitioner.
20* 'We, E. C. Hurt, Jr., of Chatham, Virginia, and John
W. Carter, Jr., of Danville, Virginia, attorneys duly
qualified to practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, do certify that in our opinion there is error in the
order and decree complained of in the foregoing petition and
that said order and decree should be reviewed.
Given under our hand this 9th day of February, 1939.
E. C. HURT, JR.,
JNO. W. CARTER, JR.
Appeal is granted and sitpersedeas awarded. Bond .$300.00.
GEORGE L. BROWNING.
3-1-39.
Received March 2, 1939.
M. B. WATTS, Clerk.
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